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Abstract
Previous research has shown that negative stimuli elicit more attention than do positive stimuli. However, this research has relied on
response-based measures to assess attention. The current research uses the P1 component of the event-related brain potential (ERP) as a
proximal index of attention allocation to valenced stimuli. In two studies, P1 amplitude was measured while participants evaluated positive
and negative pictures. In both studies, principal components analysis showed that P1 amplitudes to frequent stimuli and to rare negative
stimuli were larger than P1 amplitudes to rare positive stimuli. This is (a) evidence for the extremely rapid (<120ms) differentiation of
positive and negative stimuli and (b) process-based evidence for a negativity bias in attention allocation.
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Zajonc [42] postulated that affective processing was sepa-
rable from cognitive processing. Since that time, researchers
have sought to characterize the form and function of the
affective system. In searching for general principles of
evaluative processing, researchers have consistently found
that negative stimuli have a greater impact on information
processing than do positive stimuli [4,7,38]. Although most
theorists agree that this bias toward negative information
is evolutionary in origin, there have been few theories at-
tempting to explain the multifaceted effects that negative
stimuli can have on information processing.
To address this lacuna, Cacioppo et al. [8] (see also [5])
advanced a model of affective processing which suggests
that stimuli are evaluated at multiple points in the infor-
mation processing stream. The reason for this seeming
redundancy, they argue, is that as humans evolved evalu-
ative functions were rerepresented [19] at multiple levels
throughout the neuraxis. That is, as we evolved, newer eval-
uative systems did not replace the more primitive ones, but
rather they served to integrate and expand upon the func-
tionality of such systems. Therefore, humans currently pos-
sess multiple evaluative systems that vary in the level of the
neuraxis in which they exist (e.g. low-level, primitive pro-
cessing in the amygdala versus integrative processing in the
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cortex). Moreover, because these systems are partially in-
dependent, the way in which they generate evaluations may
differ greatly from system to system. One manifestation of
this effect is that as a general rule, the systems responsible
for evaluating negative stimuli respond more strongly than
those responsible for evaluating positive stimuli [8].
One result of this bias toward negative information is that
negative stimuli are often evaluated more extremely than
normatively equally extreme positive stimuli [1,18,21]. That
is, there is an extremity bias in evaluation. Although the
extremity bias is an important one, it is not the only bias
negative information can evoke. Given that stimuli are be-
ing evaluated at many levels of the neuraxis, it stands to
reason that biases toward negative information may occur
during processing stages other than the explicit evaluation
of a stimulus. For example, a growing body of literature is
documenting an attention bias toward negative information.
That is, our attention is automatically drawn to negative in-
formation more strongly than it is automatically drawn to
positive information [15,34].
In an early study of the attention bias, Hansen and Hansen
[15] showed participants grids of happy faces with a lone
angry face, and grids of angry faces with a lone happy face.
Participants were faster at picking the angry face out of a
happy grid than vice versa, suggesting that their attention
wasautomaticallydrawntotheangryfaces.Thisﬁndingwas
extended by recent work of Öhman et al. [30] who showed
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that this attention bias held for threatening faces (similar to
Hansen and Hansen’s angry faces), but not for other types
of negative faces (i.e. sad and scheming faces).
Seeking to demonstrate that the attention bias was not
limited to facial processing, Pratto and John [34] used the
emotional Stroop task to assess the attention demands of
positive and negative trait adjectives. In this paradigm, par-
ticipants are shown positive and negative words written in
different colors and asked to name the color in which the
word is written as quickly as possible. Differences in color
naming latencies for positive and negative words index the
extent to which participants’ attention is being automatically
drawn away from the color naming task and focused on the
word being presented. Pratto and John’s results showed that
negative traits had longer color naming latencies than posi-
tive traits, suggesting that participants’ attention was being
automatically drawn to the negative words more than it was
being drawn to the positive words.
One limitation of the research on the attention bias is
that it does not specify when in the information processing
stream more attention is allocated to negative stimuli, nor
does it specify how this differential allocation occurs. This
shortcoming can lead to interpretational problems, because
of the ambiguity about what mental processes are leading
to the observed effects. For example, it is possible that neg-
ative stimuli receive more attention beginning extremely
early during information processing. This difference is then
carried throughout the subsequent processing stages and is
thereby reﬂected in the reaction time measures described in
the above studies. An equally viable possibility is that posi-
tive and negative stimuli do not differ in the amount of atten-
tion that they are initially allocated, but rather they differ in
the amount of downstream processing they receive. That is,
perhaps people have evolved to have stronger response dis-
positions when processing negative stimuli than when pro-
cessing positive stimuli [10]. These stronger dispositions for
negative information could facilitate responding in tasks in
which participants were responding to the negative features
of the stimulus (as in [15]), and interfere with responding on
tasks in which some other aspect of the stimulus was being
judged (as in [34]). If this were the case, researchers may
very well observe differences on attentional measures in the
absences of differences in the initial attentional allocation.
1. Event-related brain potentials
Measures that provide information about moment-by-
moment attention allocation would enable researchers to
choose between these two alternative mechanisms of the at-
tention bias. Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) can serve
this purpose. ERPs are depictions of the electrical activity
on the scalp that results from the neural processing of a
given stimulus. To ease analysis, ERPs may be conceptually
broken down into a small number of components, each re-
ﬂecting the extent to which a single information processing
function is engaged. Therefore, selected ERP components
may be suitable for examining the extent to which certain
categories of stimuli (e.g. positive and negative pictures)
evoke discrete information processing functions (e.g. an
early allocation of attention) while simultaneously reducing
the potential contaminating inﬂuences of other processes
(e.g. differential response dispositions).
An illustration of the advantages of using ERPs to tap a
discrete process is given by Ito et al. [18]. They sought to
examine if the extremity bias was due to evaluative catego-
rizations per se or to differences in response dispositions.
To test this, they used the late positive potential (LPP), a
component of the ERP that indexes the evaluative catego-
rization stage of information processing, with larger LPPs
indicating that a stimulus is more evaluatively discrepant
from the stimuli that preceded it [6,13]. Participants were
shown predominantly neutral pictures with occasional pos-
itive and negative pictures interspersed. The positive and
negative targets were selected to be equally evaluatively
extreme and equally arousing using previously developed
norms [17]. Their results showed that negative stimuli
elicited larger LPPs than positive stimuli suggesting that,
despite being equated on self reported extremity, negative
stimuli were being evaluated more extremely than positive
stimuli. From these data, Ito and her colleagues were able
to reject the idea that the extremity bias toward negative
information was solely the result of response processes,
and conclude that this bias was occurring at the evaluative
categorization stage of information processing.
To use ERPs to examine the attention bias, a component
must be found that is sensitive to the amount of attention
allocated to a stimulus. The P1, a positive-going compo-
nent of the ERP that is maximal over the occipital lobe and
peaks between 100 and 150ms after stimulus onset, is such
a component. Speciﬁcally, the P1 is the result of neural ac-
tivity in the extrastriate area of the visual cortex [11].A s
more attention is allocated to a visual stimulus, more ex-
trastriate neurons are recruited to process the stimulus and
P1 amplitude increases, thereby giving a direct measure of
attention allocation. Demonstrating this sensitivity to atten-
tion, studies in which participants are instructed to attend
to stimuli in one location and ignore those in another show
larger P1s to targets in the attended area than to those in the
unattended area [11]. Similarly, in studies in which attention
is involuntarily manipulated (e.g. via the inhibition of return
paradigm), P1s are larger to attended than unattended stim-
uli [28]. Therefore, in order to directly examine the attention
bias toward negative information, we presented positive and
negative stimuli to participants and measured the extent to
which each type of stimulus evoked a P1.
2. Processing speed
Prior work within affective and cognitive neuroscience
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within the extrastriate cortex. For example, Lane et al. [23]
used positron emission tomography (PET) to demonstrate
that the valence of a picture can alter the amount of neu-
ral activity in the extrastriate cortex. While this evidence is
suggestive that the P1 will be modulated by the valence of a
picture, PET gives insufﬁcient temporal resolution to make
this claim. It is certainly possible that while positive and
negative pictures are being initially processed they receive
equal attention, but later downstream processing allocates
more attention to negative stimuli, and therefore extrastri-
ate activity increases subsequent to the generation of the P1.
Therefore, indexing the extent to which positive and nega-
tive pictures elicit differential P1s will build on Lane et al.’s
[23] prior work by specifying when the differential extras-
triate activity is taking place.
Using the P1 as a measure of attention allocation also al-
lows us to answer questions about the speed with which pos-
itive and negative information are differentiated that have
not been addressed. Many theories suggest that we pro-
cessaffectiveinformationrapidly[42]andautomatically[2].
However, most methods do not allow us to examine exactly
how quickly positive and negative information are differen-
tiated. For example, methods that show participant’s positive
and negative stimuli and then measure reaction times (e.g.
priming paradigms [2]; Stroop color naming tasks; [34])
often show differentiation of positive and negative stimuli
500–600ms after stimulus onset. Obviously, this long la-
tency is more a function of the time that it takes to generate
a response than the time it takes to evaluate a stimulus. A
more valid measure of processing time comes from studies
that use psychophysiological measures to index the point at
which differentiation of positive and negative stimuli occurs.
Both studies examining event-related brain potentials [6,9]
and those examining the eyeblink component of the star-
tle response [40] have shown discrimination times for pos-
itive and negative stimuli as early as 200ms post-stimulus
onset.
If indeed evaluative processing is as ubiquitous and rapid
as suggested, then there should be some evidence for dif-
ferentiation of positive and negative stimuli prior to 200ms.
Given that the P1 component of the ERP peaks between 100
and 150ms post-stimulus onset, ﬁnding modulation of the
P1 by valence would be the ﬁrst evidence of a general eval-
uative mechanism that differentiates stimuli this rapidly. It
would also lend additional credence to the aforementioned
theories that postulate the very rapid processing of affective
stimuli.
Therefore, the current studies have two aims. First, the
studies will test the hypothesis that a measure of atten-
tion allocation in the extrastriate cortex will conﬁrm the
interpretations made in prior studies that negative infor-
mation elicits more attention than positive information.
Second, if the valence of a stimulus modulates the P1,
this will provide evidence that the differentiation of posi-
tive and negative information occurs 100ms after stimulus
onset.
3. Experiment 1
Because of the preliminary nature of this work and be-
cause previous work has not indicated that stimulus valence
is able to modulate the amplitude of the P1, in Experiment
1 it was important to use a strong valence manipulation.
The use of contrast effects, whereby valenced stimuli may
be made to appear mode extreme by preceding them with
a stimulus of the opposite valence, is one way to do this.
That is, by having negative pictures follow positive pictures,
the former should seem more negative to the participants.
Similarly, having positive pictures follow negative pictures
should enhance the participants’ positive evaluations of the
positive pictures. Therefore, in this experiment, participants
were presented with positive and negative pictures embed-
ded in positive and negative contexts and P1 amplitude was
measured in order to determine if negative pictures elicit
more attention than do positive pictures at the earliest stages
of attentional processing.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Thirty-four Ohio State University undergraduates partic-
ipated in this study for partial course credit. All were right
handed and had right-handed parents. Data from two par-
ticipants were excluded because of excessive artifact in the
data (n = 1), or voluntary withdrawal from the study (n =
1). All analyses were performed on the remaining 32 par-
ticipants, 16 of whom were male.
3.1.2. Materials
Twenty normatively positive and 20 normatively nega-
tive pictures were selected from the International Affec-
tive Picture System (IAPS) [25] for use during this study.
Using norms from Ito et al. [17], the positive and nega-
tive pictures were selected such that they were matched on
self-reported arousal and evaluative extremity. For the exper-
imental paradigm (see procedure below), the pictures from
each valence were further subdivided into three groups, two
containing 5 pictures each, the other containing 10 pictures.
Each of these subgroups retained the evaluative extremity
and arousal of the whole.1
3.1.3. Procedure
Upon arrival at the lab, research participants were given
an overview of the procedure and gave informed consent.
Participants then had electrodes attached to their heads for
1 Stimuli serving as negative background pictures were IAPS slides
2205, 2490, 2710, 3160, 3550, 7360, 9140, 9415, 9600 and 9910. Stimuli
serving as positive background pictures were slides 1463, 2070, 5600,
5623, 5760, 5830, 7580, 8031, 8210 and 8531. The two groups of negative
targets were composed of slides 3350, 3530, 6550, 9220 and 9340; and
6570, 9005, 9290, 9320 and 9560. The two groups of positive targets
were composed of slides 1540, 1920, 2360, 4610 and 7350; and 1610,
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the physiological recording. During this time, participants
ﬁlled out a questionnaire that assessed their handedness.
Participants were then seated in a sound-attenuating, elec-
trically shielded room and given instructions for the task.
They were told that they would be watching pictures on a
computer monitor and their job would be to indicate if they
thought the pictures were positive or negative by pushing
the appropriate button on a response pad. After indicating
that they understood the task, participants were exposed to
four practice trials and began the experiment.
The experimental trials were presented to participants
in the following manner. First, a background picture was
presented on the computer screen for 11s. This picture
was scaled to take up the entire screen. At 4, 6 or 8s
(determined randomly) after picture onset, a target picture
was be embedded within the background picture for 1s.
After offset of the target picture, the background picture
remained on the screen for the remainder of the 11s dura-
tion. To ensure participants were engaged in the task, they
were asked to indicate the valence of the large and small
pictures after picture offset. The hand with which they in-
dicated a stimulus was positive was counterbalanced across
participants.
Participants viewed stimuli in two counterbalanced
blocks, each composed of sixty trials. In one block, the
background pictures were always positive whereas in the
other block the background pictures were always negative.
In both blocks, half of the time, the target picture was pos-
itive whereas the other half of the time, the target picture
was negative. Different groups of pictures were used in the
two blocks. Each individual picture was viewed a total of
six times by the participants.
Recapping, the experimental design was a 2 (background
picture valence: positive or negative) by 2 (target picture va-
lence: positive or negative) by 2 (block order: positive block
ﬁrst or negative block ﬁrst) by 2 (hand: right hand indicates
positive or right hand indicates negative) mixed-model de-
sign with the last two factors manipulated between groups.
ERPs were recorded only during presentation of the target
pictures. Upon completion of the study, participants were
debriefed, thanked and released.
3.1.4. Psychophysiological data collection and cleaning
EEG data were recorded from 28 tin electrodes mounted
in an elastic cap (ElectroCap International, Eaton, OH).
The locations of the electrodes were based on an expanded
version of the international 10–20 electrode placement
system. Because the component of interest, the P1, is not
strongly lateralized when images are presented to both
visual ﬁelds, we analyzed four sites along midline of the
scalp, Fz, Cz, Pz, and Oz. Each of these sites was refer-
enced on-line to the left mastoid while the right mastoid
was recorded for later off-line referencing. Additionally,
two tin cup electrodes were placed above and below the
participants’ left eyes to record vertical eye movements
and eyeblinks. Finally, two tin cup electrodes were placed
on the outer canthi of both eyes to record horizontal eye
movements. Interelectrode impedances were below all
10k .
Electrical activity from the scalp (EEG) and eyes (EOG)
were ampliﬁed by a NeuroScan Synamps ampliﬁer, which
applied a band pass ﬁlter between 0.1 and 30Hz (12dB
roll-off). The data were then digitized by a computer at
1000Hz and stored on the hard drive for later analysis. Each
recording epoch began 128ms before the small picture ap-
peared on the screen and continued for 1024ms after stim-
ulus onset.
To eliminate extraneous noise, several off-line signal pro-
cessing techniques were performed. First, in order to remove
spurious laterality effects, the data were rereferenced to a
mathematically simulated linked ears reference (R.J. David-
son, personal communication, 21 September 1995). Next, in
order to remove baseline differences, the average amplitude
of each electrode for each trial over the 128ms baseline pe-
riod was set to zero. Further, to remove artifacts caused by
eyeblinks a regression procedure was used in which vari-
ance correlated with vertical EOG activity was removed
from the EEG signal [36]. Subsequently, trials were individ-
ually inspected and excluded if non-neurogenic artifact was
present.
3.1.5. Data reduction and analysis
After deleting trials with artifacts, in order to remove all
electrical activity that was not time locked to the stimulus,
each participant’s individual trials were aggregated based
on trial type. That is, one average ERP waveform was con-
structed for each cell of the aforementioned 2 (background
picture valence) by 2 (target picture valence). Therefore,
from each participant, four averages were generated, each
containing data from four scalp electrode sites.
Quantifying the P1 in paradigms with complex stimuli
and modest numbers of stimulus presentations can be prob-
lematic because of the relatively low signal to noise ratio of
the component. Standard peak picking techniques are often
unable to pick the signal out of the surrounding noise. To
overcome this difﬁculty, we decided to use principal com-
ponents analysis (PCA) to separate overlapping components
[14,39].
In PCA, a set of averaged ERP waveforms are statistcally
examined for covariations in amplitude across time points.
From patterns of covariation across time points, scalp sites,
andparticipants,thePCAdecomposesasetofaveragewave-
formsintoasmallnumberofvoltage×time functions(called
components) with each component representing a portion of
the overall variance in the set input waveforms. Each com-
ponent consists of one covariance (called a component load-
ing) for each time point in the ERP waveforms, with the
loading indicating the extent to which that component has
an inﬂuence on that time point. Therefore, higher loadings
indicate time points where a component is strongly active,
whereas small loadings indicate time points where compo-
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Fig. 1. Component amplitude as a function of time for Experiment 1. Components are number by the rank order of proportion of variance for which
they account.
In addition to the component loadings, PCA also gener-
ates a set of component scores. These scores indicate the
extent to which a component is present in a given wave-
form. Therefore, if a particular component extracted by the
PCA is the result of a information processing function (e.g.
the allocation of attention), then component scores for that
component may be used to make inferences about the extent
to which that function is being performed in the relevant ex-
perimental condition in the same way peak amplitudes are
used to infer process engagement.
Therefore, in lieu of quantifying ERP components by as-
sessing peak amplitude in a given time window, a principal
components analysis was performed on the data. As men-
tioned previously, PCA analyzes the patterns of covariation
between time points in the average waveforms in order to
consolidate the total variance of the waveforms down into
the activity of a small number of underlying components. To
do this, each average created previously was entered into the
PCA as a voltage × time function. Internally within SPSS,
the data were converted to a covariance matrix before analy-
sis (as recommended by [14]), so the components outputted
would represent deviations from the grand mean waveform.
To ensure that the PCA’s components would be consistent
with the underlying neural functioning, the output of the
PCAwassubjectedtoavarimaxrotationandsixcomponents
were extracted. The component scores were then saved for
each component by subject by electrode by average combi-
nation and analyzed using the GLM module of SPSS.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Principal components analysis
The output of a PCA is two matrices, one of component
loadings, and the other of component scores. The matrix
of component loadings shows the relationship between the
extracted components and time. That is, each component
has a loading for each time point that indexes the extent
to which that component is active at that time point. In the
matrix of component scores, each average that was inputted
into the PCA receives a score for each component extracted
by the PCA. These component scores index the extent to
which each component is present in the given ERP average.
Graphing the component loadings versus time yields a
depiction of the time-points over which the components
exhibit inﬂuence (Fig. 1). In Fig. 1, the six components
extracted by the PCA are depicted. The numbering of the
components represents the rank order of proportion of vari-
ance accounted for by the components. To determine the
extent to which each of these components is present at any
given electrode site, or in any given experimental condition,
the component scores may be statistically analyzed.
3.2.2. Component scores
Because of our interest in the P1, we focused our analyses
on the component in the appropriate time region, labeled
component four in Fig. 1. If this component is indeed a P1, it
should possess the characteristic latency, scalp distribution,
and polarity of the P1. That is, it should peak between 100
and 150ms after stimulus onset, it should be maximal at
the occipital scalp sites and it should be positive going at
that scalp site. Consistent with the ﬁrst criterion, the peak
of the ﬁrst component in the PCA is at 117ms, within the
appropriate time window. To address the second criterion,
we analyzed the mean component scores for the earliest
component across all four scalp sites. We found a signiﬁcant
main effect for site F(3,29) = 7.21, P = 0.001. Follow-up
t-tests conﬁrmed that this main effect was due to the P1
being largest over the occipital electrode site and the other
three sites not differing from each other (Oz M = 0.480,
S.E. = 0.131; Pz M =− 0.0578, S.E. = 0.115; Cz M =
−0.169, S.E. = 0.123; Fz M =− 0.253, S.E. = 0.099).
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Fig. 2. Averaged ERP waveforms at the midline occipital electrode (Oz) to target positive and negative stimuli preceded by either a positive or negative
background stimulus. The earliest positive-going (downward) deﬂection is the P1, which is larger for negative stimuli than positive stimuli, regardless of
the valence of the background picture.
peak at Oz, the component score at Oz must be multiplied
by the component loading at its peak value. Because both
of these values are positive, the component is positive going
at Oz. Based on these three criteria, we are treating the ﬁrst
component as a P1.
To assess the effect of the experimental variables on the
amplitude of the P1, we performed a 2 (background picture
valence: positive or negative) by 2 (target picture valence:
positive or negative) by 2 (block order: positive block ﬁrst or
negative block ﬁrst) by 2 (hand: right hand indicates positive
or right hand indicates negative) GLM of the P1 component
scores at Oz. The latter two factors did not interact with
the variables of interest in meaningful ways, therefore they
were collapsed across (though the statistical results were the
same whether these factors were included or excluded).
After removing the between groups factors, the analy-
sis simpliﬁed to a 2 (background picture valence: positive
or negative) by 2 (target picture valence: positive or neg-
ative). Fig. 2 displays the grand average waveforms from
Table 1
P1 component amplitude as a function of scalp site and condition for Experiment 1
Condition Scalp site
Fz Cz Pz Oz
Positive background
Positive target −0.207 (0.157) −0.121 (0.166) −0.019 (0.183) 0.269 (0.211)
Negative target −0.441 (0.133) −0.288 (0.149) −0.09 (0.49) 0.775 (0.169)
Negative background
Positive target −0.222 (0.179) −0.205 (0.201) −0.172 (0.179) 0.204 (0.213)
Negative target −0.141 (0.134) −0.063 (0.176) 0.05 (0.151) 0.671 (0.138)
Note: Values are unitless component scores. Standard errors are in parentheses.
each experimental condition. The valence of the background
picture did not have any direct or interactive effects on P1
component scores (both Fs less than one). In contrast, the
valence of the target picture did affect component scores
with negative stimuli (M = 0.723, S.E. = 0.131) eliciting
larger P1s than positive stimuli (M = 0.237, S.E. = 0.162),
F(1,31) = 13.01; P = 0.001 (see Table 1).
3.3. Discussion
Experiment 1 contains several important ﬁndings. First,
it shows that the P1 can differentiate positive and negative
stimuli. Given that the P1 is most often interpreted as being
an index of attention allocation in the extrastriate visual
cortex, this result suggests that positive and negative stimuli
are receiving different amounts of attention very early in
the information processing stream. More importantly, the
form of this differentiation suggests that, consistent with the
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more visual attention than positive stimuli. Second, this is
the ﬁrst evidence of a general evaluative mechanism that dif-
ferentiates valence within approximately 100ms of stimulus
onset. Thereby, this result lends additional credence to ar-
guments that suggest that affective information is processed
very rapidly.
Like most preliminary data, these have possible alterna-
tive explanations. Most problematically, it may be that the
positive and negative stimuli differ on some dimension other
than valence (e.g. perhaps the negative pictures contain more
red, due to their depictions of blood) and it is this other di-
mensionthatiselicitingtheenhancedP1amplitude.Wehave
sought to address this issue in two ways. First, we measured
the overall mean luminance and luminance of red, green and
blue of each the positive and negative stimuli in Experiment
1. This examination showed that the two valences did not
differ along any of these dimensions. Second, we designed
Experiment 2 to use different stimuli in order to reduce the
likelihood that any quirks of Experiment 1’s stimulus set
were present in Experiment 2.
Further, in order to lend additional credence to the in-
terpretation that negative stimuli are eliciting more visual
attention than are positive stimuli, it would be helpful to
include a condition in which a known amount of attention
is elicited. Previous work has suggested that primed con-
structs elicit more obligatory attention than those that are
not primed [41]. Similarly, Johnston and Hawley [20] have
advanced a model of attention in which the mind is initially
biased toward expected inputs (i.e. conceptually primed
stimuli) and only later sensitive to novel stimuli. Addition-
ally, Roskos-Ewoldsen and Fazio [33] demonstrated that
stimuli for which an attitude has been repeatedly expressed
evoke enhanced attention. Finally, Schacter et al. [35] have
used positron emission tomography to show that processing
a primed word leads to greater activity in the extrastriate
area of the visual cortex relative to processing an unprimed
word, suggesting that priming increases activity in the area
responsible for generating the P1.2
Experiment 2 was designed with the following character-
istics.First,onecategoryofstimuliwaspresentedfrequently,
so that members of this category could serve as a high atten-
tion standard. Second, participants expressed their attitudes
toward these stimuli in order to increase the accessibility of
the relevant attitudes, and thereby increase attention. Third,
the frequently presented pictures were selected to avoid
priming the positive and negative targets. Finally, the differ-
entpositiveandnegativestimuliwereusedinExperiment2.3
2 It is worth noting that researchers have also documented a bias of the
mind toward novel inputs [20] and the possibility that decreased alertness
can also occur with repeated stimulus presentations [22]. However, it
seems to be the case that the effects of stimulus repetition early in the
information processing stream (i.e. in the time frame of the P1) are
facilitatory whereas inhibitory effects do not occur until later [20].
3 The study detailed in Experiment 2 was previously published in a
study using the LPP to examine the extremity bias [18]. However, the data
presented here do not duplicate those in the original report because, (a)
4. Experiment 2
Participants were shown predominantly neutral pictures,
with occasional positive and negative pictures interspersed.
The positive and negative stimuli were selected to be equally
extreme and arousing. As was found by Schacter et al. [35],
theneutralstimuliinthisdesignshouldevokealargeamount
of attention, thereby generating large P1s and establishing a
high attention comparison condition. Further, if the hypoth-
esis that negative stimuli are evoking more visual attention
than positive stimuli is correct, then P1s elicited by negative
stimuli should be signiﬁcantly larger than those elicited by
the positive stimuli.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Participants were 33 Ohio State University undergradu-
ates who received partial course credit for participation. In
order to decrease the amount of variability in brain organi-
zation, all participants were right handed with right-handed
parents. The data from ﬁve participants were unusable due
to equipment malfunction, while data from another two par-
ticipants were incomplete due to voluntary withdrawal from
the study. Finally two participants’ data were unusable due
to excessive non-neurogenic artifact. Therefore, analyses
were conducted on the data obtained from the remaining 24
participants.
4.1.2. Materials
Thirty-six normatively neutral, two normatively positive
and two normatively negative pictures were selected from
the IAPS [25] for use during this study. The positive and
negative pictures were again selected such that they were
matched on self-reported arousal and evaluative extremity
[17]. For the experimental paradigm (see procedure below),
the neutral stimuli were separated into two groups, each with
mean valences near the midpoint of the nine-point valence
scale (both groups M = 5.10). The positive and negative
stimuli were chosen to be equally extreme (positive stim-
uli mean valence rating = 8.31, negative stimuli mean va-
lence rating = 1.89), and equally arousing (positive stimuli
mean arousal rating = 7.43, positive stimuli mean arousal
rating = 7.34, both on a nine-point scale).4
the primary electrode site described in this report (Oz) was not analyzed
for the initial paper, (b) the latencies of the ERP components analyzed
in the current and initial papers do not overlap (the P1 peaks before
150ms whereas the LPP does not start to appear until 300ms) and (c)
the research focus of the two articles (i.e. the extremity bias versus the
attention bias) is fundamentally different.
4 Neutral group one (an arbitrary distinction used for counterbalancing)
consisted of IAPS slides 5500, 5800, 6150, 7002, 7025, 7035, 7040,
7080, 7090, 7140, 7217, 7224, 7285, 7550 and 7820. Neutral group two
consisted of slides 2230, 2840, 5900, 7000, 7006, 7009, 7010, 7030,
7050, 7100, 7130, 7150, 7170, 7190, 7233, 7235, 7284 and 9210. Positive
targets were slides 8490 and 8510, whereas negative targets were slides
3030 and 6230.178 N.K. Smith et al./Neuropsychologia 41 (2003) 171–183
4.1.3. Procedure
Upon arrival at the lab, research participants were given
an overview of the procedure and gave informed consent.
Participants then had electrodes attached to their heads for
the physiological recording. During this time, participants
ﬁlled out a questionnaire that assessed their handedness.
Participants were then seated in a sound-attenuating, elec-
trically shielded room and given instructions for the task.
They were told that they would see pictures in sequences
of ﬁve and that after each picture went off of the screen,
they should indicate whether it was positive (or negative,
by block, see below) or neutral by pushing the appropriate
button. After indicating that they understood the task, par-
ticipants began the experiment.
Participants watched pictures presented in two counter-
balanced blocks. In each block, they viewed 60 sequences
of ﬁve pictures each. In one block, participants saw predom-
inantly neutral pictures with occasional positive pictures. In
the other block, participants saw a different group of neu-
tral pictures with occasional negative pictures. The group of
neutral pictures that was associated with each valence was
counterbalanced across participants. In both blocks, pictures
were presented for 1000ms each with a 1000ms interstim-
ulus interval, and participants were given a chance to pause
after each ﬁve picture sequence. ERPs were recorded to all
positive and negative stimuli and to an equal number of neu-
tral stimuli in each block. Table 2 shows the arrangement of
stimuli within each of the given blocks.
Therefore, the experimental design can best be repre-
sented as a 2 (block: positive or negative) by 2 (stimulus
probability: high probability neutral or low probability va-
lenced) by 2 (block order: positive block ﬁrst or negative
block ﬁrst) by 2 (neutral group: neutral group 1 associated
with positive or neutral group 2 associated with positive)
by 2 (hand: right hand indicates valenced or right hand
Table 2
Stimulus presentation sequences in Experiment 2
Trial type Stimulus position
12345
Trial type 1—positive block Neu Neu Neu Nen Neu
Trial type 2—positive block Neu Neu Neu Neu Neu
Trial type 3—positive block Neu Nen Neu Neu Neu
Trial type 4—positive block Neu Neu Pos Neu Neu
Trial type 5—positive block Neu Neu Neu Pos Neu
Trial type 6—positive block Neu Neu Neu Neu Pos
Trial type 1—negative block Neu Neu Neu Neu Neu
Trial type 2—negative block Neu Nen Neu Neu Neu
Trial type 3—negative block Nen Neu Neu Neu Neu
Trial type 4—negative block Neu Neu Neg Neu Neu
Trial type 5—negative block Neu Neu Neu Neg Neu
Trial type 6—negative block Neu Neu Neu Neu Neg
Note: Pos indicates a positive stimulus presentation, Neg the negative
stimulus presentation, Neu the neutral stimulus presentation. Bold type
indicates a trial during which ERPs were recorded.
indicates neutral) mixed-model design with the last three
factors manipulated between groups. Upon completion of
the study, participants were debriefed, thanked and released.
4.1.4. Psychophysiological data collection and cleaning
The psychophysiological equipment and data cleaning
were identical to those in Experiment 1. Aggregate wave-
forms were created for each of the four block by stimulus
probability conditions. That is, for each participant, four av-
erages were created: one each for positive stimuli, negative
stimuli, neutral stimuli in the block with positive stimuli and
neutral stimuli in the block with negative stimuli. As in the
previous study, four electrodes from each average (Fz, Cz,
Pz and Oz) were entered into a PCA. Six components were
extracted, and varimax rotated and the component scores
were saved and analyzed via GLM.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Principal components analysis
In Fig. 3, the six components extracted by the PCA are
depicted.Thenumberingofthecomponentsagainrepresents
the rank order of proportion of variance accounted for by the
components. The component structure of this study is very
similar to that of Experiment 1, suggesting that the same
basic components are being modulated in the two studies.
Again, there is an early component, component number ﬁve,
peaking 112ms after stimulus onset. Because it is active in
the latency range of the P1, the analyses will focus on this
component.
4.2.2. Component scores
If component 5 is a P1, it should have the appropriate
latency, scalp distribution and polarity. Given that it peaks
112ms after stimulus onset, it possesses the correct latency.
To assess the scalp distribution, the mean component scores
for each scalp site were analyzed. Replicating the Experi-
ment 1, there was a main effect for scalp site, F(3,21) =
6.96 P<. 005. Consistent with the notion that component
5 is a P1, it was most positive over the occipital lobe and de-
creased signiﬁcantly or marginally at each subsequent scalp
site (M Oz = 0.660, S.E. = 0.183; M Pz = 0.123, S.E. =
0.154; M Cz =− 0.319, S.E. = 0.138; M Fz =− 0.464,
S.E. = 0.119). Finally, the component was again positive
going over the occipital lobe. Therefore, as in the previous
experiment, analyses focused on component 5 at Oz. See
Fig. 4, for the raw grand average waveforms at the occipital
site.
To investigate the effect that picture valence had on P1
amplitude, we performed a 2 (block: positive or negative)
by 2 (stimulus probability: high probability neutral or low
probability valenced) by 2 (block order: positive block ﬁrst
or negative block ﬁrst) by 2 (neutral group: neutral group 1
associated with positive or neutral group 2 associated with
positive) by 2 (hand: right hand indicates valenced or right
hand indicates neutral) GLM. The latter three factors didN.K. Smith et al./Neuropsychologia 41 (2003) 171–183 179
Fig. 3. Component amplitude as a function of time for Experiment 2. Components are number by the rank order of proportion of variance for which
they account. Note the similar morphology of the components to those of Experiment 1.
not interact with the ﬁrst two variables in meaningful ways,
therefore they were collapsed across (though the statistical
results were the same whether these factors were included
or excluded).
After removing the between groups factors, the analysis
simpliﬁed to a 2 (block: positive or negative) by 2 (stimu-
lus probability: high probability neutral or low probability
valenced) design. This analysis yielded a main effect for
Block (F(1,23) = 25.3, P<. 001), such that the block
in which negative stimuli were present yielded larger P1s
(M = 0.900, S.E. = 0.199) than the block in which pos-
itive stimuli were present (M = 0.420, S.E. = 0.179), as
well as a main effect for Stimulus Probability (F(1,23) =
56.8, P<. 001), in which frequently presented neutral tar-
gets elicited larger P1s (M = 1.053, S.E. = 0.179) than
did rarely presented valenced targets (M = 0.268, S.E. =
0.201). More important than either of these main effects,
however, was the signiﬁcant two-way interaction between
them (F(1,23) = 28.6, P<. 001). The form of this inter-
action was as follows: across both blocks, the amplitude of
Fig. 4. Averaged ERP waveforms at the midline occipital electrode (Oz) to frequent neutral stimuli and rare positive and negative stimuli. Again, the
earliest positive-going (downward) deﬂection is the P1, which is larger for frequent neutral stimuli and infrequent negative stimuli than for infrequent
positive stimuli.
the P1s elicited by frequent, neutral stimuli did not differ
(M neutral stimuli in the block with positive targets = 1.06,
S.E. = 0.172; M neutral stimuli in the block with nega-
tive targets = 1.05, S.E. = 0.197, ns). This stands in con-
trast to P1 amplitudes elicited by the rare, valenced stimuli,
which evidenced the same effect as in the previous studies:
negative stimuli elicited larger P1s than did positive stim-
uli (t(24) = 6.08, P<. 001, M positive stimuli =− 0.219,
S.E. = 0.215, M negative stimuli = 0.754, S.E. = 0.217).
See Table 3 for P1 means for each experimental condition
at each scalp site.
4.3. Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 replicated and extended
the basic ﬁndings of Experiment 1. First, despite a differ-
ent stimulus presentation scheme, the component structure
for the two experiments was similar, suggesting that the
PCA is representing a stable component structure. Second,
the latency, scalp distribution and polarity of the earliest180 N.K. Smith et al./Neuropsychologia 41 (2003) 171–183
Table 3
P1 component amplitude as a function of scalp site and experimental condition
Condition Scalp site
Fz Cz Pz Oz
Block with positive targets
Positive target −0.323 (0.173) −0.126 (0.185) −0.068 (0.192) −0.219 (0.215)
Neutral target −0.443 (0.108) −0.217 (0.134) 0.383 (0.144) 1.06 (0.172)
Block with negative targets
Negative target −0.77 (0.144) −0.677 (0.18) −0.136 (0.209) 0.754 (0.217)
Neutral target −0.32 (0.155) −0.256 (0.167) 0.311 (0.168) 1.046 (0.197)
Note: Values are unitless component scores. Standard errors are in parentheses.
component again suggest that it was indeed a P1. Most
importantly, the functionality of the P1 conformed to the
predictions derived from the previous experiment. That is,
replicating Experiment 1, negative stimuli evoked signiﬁ-
cantly larger P1s than did positive stimuli. Given our early
attentional interpretation of the P1, this suggests that nega-
tive stimuli are being allocated more attention than positive
stimuli very early in the information processing stream.
Further, because different stimuli were used in Experiment
2, the hypothesis that the P1 results were due to some factor
other than valence is rendered less likely.
The ﬁnal difference between Experiments 1 and 2 was
the addition of a high probability stimulus group (in this
case, neutral stimuli). Designed as a high attention com-
parison condition, these stimuli were predicted to evoke a
large amount of attention early in the information process-
ing stream. Consistent with that prediction, neutral stimuli
did evoke larger P1s than positive and negative stimuli, pro-
viding converging evidence that P1 amplitude is positively
related with attention allocation.
A seeming incompatibility between the results of Exper-
iments 1 and 2 concerns primed neutral stimuli resulting in
large P1s in Experiment 2 but frequently presented positive
and negative stimuli not demonstrating P1 enhancements in
Experiment 1. The most likely explanation for this differ-
entiation is the number of the participants’ exposures to the
frequently presented stimuli. In Experiment 1, participants
in the positive (negative) block viewed a total of 60 positive
(negative) picture presentations and 30 negative (positive)
picture presentations. In Experiment 2, in each block, par-
ticipants saw 270 neutral presentations and 30 valenced
presentations. Obviously, both the absolute number of stim-
ulus presentations and the proportion of rare to frequent
stimuli favored a larger priming effect in Experiment 2 than
in Experiment 1.
5. General discussion
Across two studies we have demonstrated that negative
stimuli evoke larger P1s than positive stimuli. These results
address the two research questions set out in the introduc-
tion. First, given that the P1 is a measure of early attention
allocation in the extrastriate visual cortex, we have repli-
cated the established social psychological phenomenon of
enhanced attention allocation to negative stimuli relative to
positive stimuli [15,34]. More importantly, because we used
a direct measure of attention allocation, it is not possible
that our results are due to differential stimulus processing
subsequent to the allocation of attention.
Second, our results show that positive and negative stim-
uli are being differentiated within 100ms of stimulus onset.
Zajonc [43] and others have suggested that the role of emo-
tion is to focus our information processing resources on and
guide our behavioral responses to important stimuli. Clearly,
the faster we can separate negative from positive stimuli, the
faster we can engage an appropriate response strategy, and
the more successful we will be in responding to the world.
Understanding that positive and negative stimuli are differ-
entiated within 100ms of our initial exposure to the stimulus
is consistent with the idea of a rapid differentiation of the
valences [42].
An interesting question that remains is the cause of the
attention bias. That is, although it may be that evolutionary
forces caused humans to preferentially attend to negative in-
formation (i.e. ultimate causes of the bias), there still must
be a set of psychological processes that bring about this re-
sult (i.e. proximate causes of the bias). Two interesting prox-
imate causes can be advanced for this bias: one rooted in
the affective associations that stimuli possess, the other sug-
gesting that low-level perceptual processes are responsible
for the bias.
Given the current results that frequent exposure to neutral
stimuli increase the amount of attention paid to those stim-
uli, and complementary results that show that priming pos-
itive stimuli can eliminate the attention bias [37], a logical
conceptualization of the origin of the attention bias rests on
the relative accessibility of positivity and negativity. That is,
negative stimuli attract more attention than positive stimuli
because they are more accessible.
There are several plausible mechanisms by which nega-
tive stimuli could acquire this enhanced accessibility. First,
negative stimuli may simply be more chronically accessible
than positive stimuli. Chronic construct accessibility can
lead to the attention effects observed [3], however it also
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(e.g. interpreting stimuli in the environment consistently
with the accessible constructs [16]) that do not seem to
occur. Therefore, it seems unlikely that a pure accessibility
differential is responsible for the attention bias. Second,
it is possible that the cognitive organization of negative
stimuli allows them to be primed more easily than positive
stimuli. For example, if the associations between negative
stimuli are stronger than those between positive stimuli, it
would take fewer presentations of a negative stimulus to
activate an associated negative stimulus than it would of a
positive stimulus to activate an associated positive stimulus.
Given that in our method we use multiple presentations of
a stimulus valence, this result could arise.
Both of these explanations implicitly suggest that the at-
tention bias afforded to negative stimuli does not have any-
thing to do with their negativity per se, but rather emerges
as a result of cognitive priming. A third possible explanation
of the attention bias could suggest that neural projections
that the visual cortex receives from rudimentary affective
systems facilitate the processing of negative stimuli. That
is, it is possible that negative stimuli beneﬁt from biologi-
cal preparedness [7,12,31]. For example, there is evidence
that (a) the amygdala processes aversive information very
rapidly [26,29] (and perhaps independent of cortical pro-
cessing for simple auditory and visual stimuli [26,27]) and
that, (b) during the processing of the IAPS stimuli, the ac-
tivity of the amygdala is greater for negative pictures than
for positive pictures [24]. Given the large number of con-
nections between the amygdala and the visual cortex [29],
it is possible that the amygdala, after rapidly processing a
negative stimulus, stimulates extrastriate areas of the visual
cortex leading to enhanced neural recruitment.
A thorny issue with this hypothesis concerns how well vi-
sual information is represented at various points within the
information processing time stream. For example, in order
to affect extrastriate neural recruitment in a timely fashion,
one might suggest that a direct link from the thalamus to
the amygdala [27] could be responsible for modulating vi-
sual processing. However, in the absence of cortical pro-
cessing along that pathway, it is questionable whether visual
information is sufﬁciently well represented for the amyg-
dala to make such ﬁne grained distinctions as differentiat-
ing between positive and negative stimuli. Alternatively, a
thalamo-cortico-amygdala pathway, which could provide a
rich representation of visual information allowing differen-
tiation between positive and negative stimuli, would most
likely not be sufﬁciently timely to modulate processing in
the time frame of the P1.
An alternative, perceptual possibility suggests that our
nervous system has been sculpted to enhance attention to
simple visual stimulus attributes that have proven to be cor-
related with dangerous stimuli. For example, if, during the
course of evolution, the perceptions of threatening stimuli
tended to consist of certain spatial frequencies, it is possible
that species who evolved to preferentially attend to stim-
uli that possessed those spatial frequencies would be more
evolutionarily successful. This explanation suggests that
people are not rapidly differentiating positive and negative
stimuli per se, but instead are responding to stimulus fea-
tures that suggest threats might be present in the stimulus
ﬁeld.
6. Future directions
Aninterestingquestionthatremainsconcernstherelation-
ship between the attention bias and the extremity bias. As-
sessing these two biases simultaneously is possible because
ERPs allow monitoring sequential information processing
stages without disrupting processing by requiring an overt
response. Given in prior work, we have examined the size of
the negativity bias in studies such as these, it was reasonable
to assess the relationship between the two biases in the two
current experiments. The results of these analyses, however,
are inconsistent. That is, in Experiment 1 there was a sig-
niﬁcant correlation between the magnitude of the attention
bias and the magnitude of the extremity bias, however this
pattern was not replicated in Experiment 2.
The attention bias and extremity bias being inconsistently
related is not surprising when one considers that the biases
(a) occur at different stages of information processing, (b)
are performed by different neural substrates and (c) per-
haps serve different functions. Berntson et al. [5] suggested
that evaluation is performed by multiple, separate systems
in the brain. As a consequence of this separability, different
evaluative systems may rely on different aspects of a stim-
ulus in order to form their evaluation of it. For example,
the attention bias must rely on a very rapid evaluation, and
seems particularly sensitive to threatening information [30],
whereas the extremity bias takes longer to occur and does
not seem to require a threatening stimulus. Therefore, one
could imagine situations in which one would ﬁnd an atten-
tion bias, but not an extremity bias as well as situations in
which the reverse is true.
For example, its possible that a stimulus might be im-
mediately evaluated as threatening enough to require en-
hanced attention, but might not be perceived as negatively
during later evaluations that have the ability to bring addi-
tional sources of information to bear. For example, seeing
a large snake in a zoo might be sufﬁciently negative to
elicit enhanced attention, but contextual factors not taken
into account by the initial evaluation (e.g. the safety of the
environment) may mitigate the extremitization of the eval-
uation. On the other hand, its possible that there are stimuli
that require elaborated processing to understand that they
are negative. We might not expect this sort of stimulus to
bias attention, but rather to bias only the extremity of eval-
uation. For example, winning US$ 10 might not evoke any
extra attention at all, because it should be initially perceived
as neither threatening nor particularly negative. However,
when your two options are winning US$ 10 and winning
US$ 1000, and you only win US$ 10, the negative feelings182 N.K. Smith et al./Neuropsychologia 41 (2003) 171–183
that the disappointing win evoke might be sufﬁcient to
increase the extremity of its evaluation.
A second, related question regarding this effect is whether
it holds for all stimuli, or is being driven by a speciﬁc sub-
set. For example, Öhman and Soares [32] have shown that
subliminal aversive conditioning can occur for certain con-
ditioned stimuli (e.g. pictures of snakes), but not others (e.g.
pictures of ﬂowers). From this and related work, they theo-
rize that certain types of stimuli (i.e. biologically prepared
fear stimuli) humans are especially receptive to classical
conditioning. Put another way, our biology is prepared to
react in speciﬁc ways for certain stimuli, but not for others.
This may very well be true for attention as well. That is, do
we afford enhanced attention to all negative stimuli or does
a snake elicit more than an IRS auditor, because evolution
has had time to sculpt our nervous system to prepare for the
former but not the latter?
7. Conclusion
With these studies, we have illustrated two important
points. First, we showed that attention is allocated differ-
entially to positive and negative stimuli, and ruled out the
possibility that this due to processes downstream of the ini-
tial allocation of attention to the stimuli. Second, we fur-
thered understanding of the chronometry of evaluation. That
is, positive and negative information are differentiated from
each other within 100ms of exposure to the stimulus.
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